The Excess Power Puzzle of the EU Budget by Heikki Kauppi & Mika Widgrén
Aboa Centre for Economics
Discussion Paper No. 45
Turku 2009
Heikki Kauppi Ɇ Mika Widgrén
The Excess Power Puzzle of the
EU BudgetCopyright © Author(s)
ISSN 1796-3133
Printed in Uniprint
Turku 2009Heikki Kauppi Ɇ Mika Widgrén
The Excess Power Puzzle of the
EU Budget
Aboa Centre for Economics
Discussion Paper No. 45
March 2009
ABSTRACT
It is a constant topic of debate how the European Union (EU)
spends the money it collects from its member states. This paper
supports the idea that the EU budget battle involves one-shot
games that have persistent impacts on the budget allocations. In
one way or the other, the member states are able to establish rules
or contracts that restrict the budget allocation in advance. In the
current status quo, France and Spain are the clearest winners of
these restrictions, while Austria, Finland and Sweden, not to
mention the new member states, suffer largest losses.
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It is a constant topic of debate how the European Union (EU) spends the money it
collects from its member states. Various discussants see severe problems in the EU￿ s
budget spending and argue that the budget allocation procedures should be revised. In
fact, the European Commission (EC) is currently investigating foundations for such a
revision. This paper focuses on the question how the budget allocation is determined in
the current system. Being able to answer to this question is of fundamental importance
for the assessment of the budget and for a successful reform of the budget procedures.
The recent research o⁄ers two main views on the determination of the EU budget
allocation across member states. The ￿rst one, the ￿ needs view,￿assumes that the budget
follows the declared policy objectives of the EU. In a nutshell, these objectives say that
the budget should be allocated to poor EU regions. This entails solidarity on the part of
the wealthiest member states. The second view, the ￿ power politics view,￿argues that the
EU budget is primarily determined by sel￿shness; the member states use their political
power to obtain as much return to their own country as they can rather than care about
redistributing the common funds into regions where the funds are the most needed. Stud-
ies indicate that none of the two views alone can explain the EU budget allocation, while
there are indications that both views might play a role in the determination of the EU
budget spending. This line of research is the starting point of the present study.
A key to our analysis is a ￿ power distribution￿that speci￿es how much each member
state has voting power (in relative terms) in the Council of Ministers (CM), the key
decision maker of the EU budget spending. By game theoretical arguments, the ￿ power
distribution￿yields a unique division of the cake (i.e., the EU budget). As in Kauppi and
WidgrØn (2008), our analysis makes use of the fact that the decision procedures on the EU
budget spending di⁄er across so called ￿ compulsory￿and ￿ non-compulsory￿expenditures.
The underlying point is that CM is the primary decision maker on the former part, while
the European Parliament (EP) has potential power to decide on the latter part of the
budget spending. Previous analyses suggest that the members of EP (MEPs) may be
more willing to promote solidarity between EU states than the representative ministers in
1CM. Therefore, we expect that the allocation of the compulsory expenditure may di⁄er
signi￿cantly from that of the non-compulsory expenditure.
Using a data set covering the period 1976-2006, we ￿nd that the power distribution
matches fairly well with the shares of compulsory expenditure, while it matches rather
poorly with the shares of non-compulsory expenditure. Furthermore, we ￿nd that the
allocation of the non-compulsory expenditure is somewhat slanted towards poor member
states. These observations are consistent with previous evidence and support the hypoth-
esis that a part of the budget spending may be attributed to power politics, while another
part is likely to be driven by solidarity and the ￿ needs￿of the member states. Never-
theless, when compare the actual budget shares with the power distribution in detail,
we ￿nd some puzzling patterns. In particular, we note that France receives systemati-
cally more from the budget than the power distribution implies, whether we look at the
compulsory spending or the total budget. We say France has ￿ excess power￿that derives
from something beyond its votes in CM. By contrast, Austria, Finland and Sweden ob-
tain systematically smaller shares from the EU budget than their voting power shares
imply. Thus, their ￿ excess power￿is negative. We regard these persistent deviations from
the power distribution as the ￿ status quo bias￿of the EU budget. We consider potential
explanations for the status quo bias.
We make a hypothesis that the EU budget allocation might be pre-determined, at least
partially. The idea is that ￿ rules￿speci￿ed by the EU Treaty and the Financial frameworks
largely pre-determine how the budget will be allocated across member states. Under this
scenario, CM can only have a limited intervention into the budget allocation. We leave
it open how such rules or ￿ contracts￿are enforced in practice. A central question is what
is the power distribution that determines the pre-designed budget allocation. For us, this
is a question: what explains that the actual budget allocation deviates so systematically
from the power distribution of the voting game of the CM? What explains why France has
persistent ￿ positive excess power￿and what explains why Austria, Finland and Sweden
have persistent ￿ negative excess power￿?
One possibility is that the excess power has to do with member states￿contributions to
the budget. When the member states agree on the Treaty or on the Financial frameworks,
2they simultaneously agree on how they share the revenue collection of the budget. For
a long period of time, the member states have agreed that each state￿ s contribution is,
essentially, a ￿xed percentage of its GDP. Under this arrangement, rich member states
end up paying a lot more to the budget per capita than poor countries. To accept
such a deal, rich member states probably want to make sure that some of the money is
returned them through the budget spending. They would not accept a deal, according
to which all of their contributions are redistributed to poor member states. This line
of reasoning suggests that the actual budget allocation may be partly related to actual
contribution shares of the member states. We investigate whether this hypothesis gets
empirical support.
We ￿nd that the contribution shares indeed correlate signi￿cantly with budget shares.
Our statistical analyses suggest that the shares of the compulsory spending can be pre-
dicted partly by the power distribution and partly by the contribution shares. An in-
terpretation is that member states￿contributions entitle a partial ￿ money back,￿while
the remaining part of the compulsory expenditure is allocated by the power distribution.
Furthermore, we ￿nd that the shares of the non-compulsory spending are negatively cor-
related with the budget shares. This ￿nding is again consistent with the idea that the
non-compulsory expenditures attribute to transfers from rich member states to poor ones.
This form of solidarity might be a consequence of the in￿ uence of the EP.
A remaining puzzle is still the fact that Austria, Finland and Sweden seem to do
relatively poorly in all areas of budget spending; they do not receive as much as their
power shares and contribution shares predict. Also, France seems to enjoy an extra
premium that cannot be explained by its power or contribution share. Another persistent
outlier is Spain that receives a great premium from both compulsory and non-compulsory
budget spending, despite its moderate contribution share. What explains these systematic
deviations?
One possibility is that the whole budget procedure is subject to ￿xations that are hard
to change. France has gained much from CAP already since EU-9 or even earlier. The
rules of the CAP policies that were written thirty years ago are still in force and thereby
continue to favor France as long as CAP policies exist. When Spain entered the EU, the
3structural funds were created. It seems that the allocation rules of the structural funds
were written so as to favor Spain in particular. If the rules are ￿xed, one may assume
that signi￿cant changes to the budget allocation entail a change to the budget structure.
This may happen through changing the shares of the two major parts of the budget or by
creating new budget funds. But is there su¢ cient political support for such changes? To
answer to this question we must examine who bene￿ts and who loses when such changes
are made?
As a ￿rst cut on this, we assess whether CM might succeed in initiating changes in
the current budget structure. That is, is it possible to ￿nd su¢ cient majority to support
a change? To assess this question, we classify member states into ￿winners￿and ￿losers.￿
Here our benchmark is again the power distribution. Hence, we classify a member state as
a winner (a loser) if its budget share is larger (smaller) than its power share. We do this
classi￿cation separately for CAP and structural funds. We consider the distribution of
winners and losers across di⁄erent EU periods. We ￿nd that there has been a shortage of
coalitions to support a change in the budget structure over the years. This has gradually
created a ￿ dead lock￿of the EU budget. Hence, we conjecture that the EU budget battle
involves ￿ one-shot games￿that have persistent impacts on the budget allocations. In one
way or the other, the member states are able to establish ￿ rules￿or ￿ contracts￿that are
di¢ cult to change by CM. As an example of such a rule, we point to the ￿ four percent
rule￿that was recently established to limit a member state￿ s budget receipts to be at most
four percent of its GDP. Interestingly, we ￿nd that the actual budget shares of the new
Eastern European member states are almost as large as they can under the four percent
rule. This observation suggests that the four percent rule may prevent these member
states from obtain as much from the budget as their power shares predict. We ￿nish our
analysis by showing that the Lisbon Treaty is unlikely to make a di⁄erence to the ￿ status
quo bias￿of the EU Budget.
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the EU
budgetary procedures. Section 3 reviews the two main views, explains their foundations
and discusses their performance in previous empirical studies. Section 4 reports our
empirical analysis and, ￿nally, Section 5 concludes.
42 The Budgetary Procedure
The EU￿ s annual budget is guided by medium-term agreements on spending priorities,
called ￿ ￿nancial frameworks￿ . The current ￿nancial framework sets out broad spending
guidelines for the annual budgets from 2007 to 2013. The decision procedure of the actual
annual budget is an inter-institutional arrangement between the Council of Ministers
(CM), the European Parliament (EP) and the European Commission (EC). The actual
decision-making procedure di⁄ers between so called ￿ compulsory￿and ￿ non-compulsory￿
expenditure. The two types of budget spending have di⁄erent implications for the decision
power of the involved decision-makers.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the decision procedures for compulsory and non-compulsory
expenditure, respectively. In both cases, EC proposes a preliminary draft budget (PDB),
which is then adopted or amended by CM in its ￿rst reading. Thereafter, if EP accepts
the draft budget, as adopted or amended by CM, the draft budget is adopted. If, on the
other hand, EP proposes amendments to the draft the procedure continues. At this phase,
the procedure concerning compulsory expenditure and the one concerning non-compulsory
expenditure deviate from each other. In the former, EP needs a simple majority to propose
amendments. Abstentions have no e⁄ect in EP, since the majority is counted on the basis
of MEPs that are present. In the latter procedure, however, abstentions are e⁄ectively
like ￿ nay￿votes since the amendments require support from a majority of MEPs.
In compulsory expenditure, the proposed amendments can be divided into increasing
modi￿cations that try to increase the expenditure and into non-increasing modi￿cations
expenditure that try to reallocate funds between applications or acts adopted in the
Treaty. In both cases, CM can adopt the proposed amendments by quali￿ed majority
voting (QMV)1 or reject them. In the case of non-increasing modi￿cations, CM must
explicitly reject or change the proposed amendments to avoid adoption as amended by
EP. In the case of increasing modi￿cations, it su¢ ces for CM to not to react to keep its
mind. Thus, an adoption as amended by EP requires an active acceptance by CM using
QMV.
1Presently 255 votes of the total number of votes 345.
5In non-compulsory expenditure, EP makes the last move. After EP has proposed
amendments, CM can adopt or modify them in its second reading by QMV. In the former
case, the expenditure is adopted as amended by EP. In the latter case, EP can reject
or change CM modi￿cations by 3=5 majority and then the expenditure is adopted as
amended by EP. If EP is not able to act, the expenditure is adopted as amended by CM.2
Giving the above descriptions it is easy to see that EP￿ s in￿ uence is very limited on
the part compulsory expenditure. By contrast, in non-compulsory expenditure, EP is in
a more powerful position, since it can say the last word in the procedure. It is worth
noting, however, that modi￿cations made by EP are not unlimited.
The Lisbon Treaty that was politically agreed in June 2007 dismantles the distinction
between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure. The new budgetary procedure
makes CM and EP co-deciders regardless of the type of expenditure. In sum, it is rem-
iniscent to the decision-making procedure in non-compulsory expenditure that is based
on a co-decision between CM and EP. The budget procedure Æ la Lisbon has also simi-
larities with the co-decision procedure that is the most used decision-making procedure
in EU legislation. In recent evaluation of the co-decision procedure, Napel and WidgrØn
(2006) demonstrate that CM wields much more in￿ uence on decision-making outcomes
than EP due to the di⁄erence in their internal decision-making rules that are much more
conservative (QMV) than those in EP (simple majority). The Lisbon Treaty, however,
changes the CM voting rules towards a less conservative direction. This change may have
an impact on the budget allocation in favour of EP. The CM voting rules are, however,
still more conservative giving CM an advantage in bargaining with EP.3 A more detailed
investigation of the impact of the Lisbon Treaty is, however, left for future work.
2Note that 2=3 majority of MEPs can reject the overall budget, which restarts the procedure. In this
paper we disregard this since in terms of power relations the restarted procedure is essentially similar
game.
3See e.g. Napel and WidgrØn (2006) and Napel and WidgrØn (2008) for general considerations of CM￿ s
EP￿ s and the Commission￿ s aggregated preferences.
63 Two Baseline Views and Previous Evidence
In earlier studies, the allocation of the member states￿net and gross receipts from the
EU budget has been evaluated using either game theoretic power politics reasoning or
by needs-based calculations. We start by discussing the needs view of the EU budget
allocation.
3.1 The Needs View
The needs view is justi￿ed by the declared objectives of the EU￿ s budget policy. For
example, the CAP policies state:
￿CAP aims at achieving an adequate level of production, at a reasonable cost to con-
sumers, while ensuring a fair standard of living for the agricultural community and safe-
guarding the future of rural areas. Given the diversity of circumstances in the EU, it is
clear that achieving these goals will not result in the same economic bene￿ts for all member
states￿ 4
while the policies of the structural operations say:
￿An objective of the EU is the achievement of economic and social progress across
the member states. By their nature, structural actions should result in di⁄erences in
expenditure between member states.￿ 5
The quotations indicate that the aim of CAP and structural spending is to redistrib-
ute EU￿ s common resources to poor and rural EU regions. There are di⁄erent ways to
quantify the needs of individual member states (see section 3.3). The major problem of
the measurement is the lack of objective theoretical grounds. Needs are subjective and




73.2 The Power Politics View
An alternative to the view based on solidarity is the view that member states care only
about their own interests. Under this hypothesis, which is called the power politics view,
member states use their voting power in CM to allocate as much money to their country
as possible.
In the formal voting power analysis, the budget allocation problem is treated as the
dividing-up-the-cake problem. This is one of the most investigated problems in game and
bargaining theory. On the basis of game theory and previous analyses of the EU decision-
making, it is most natural to evaluate member states￿voting power by the Shapley-Shubik
index (SSI) (Shapley and Shubik (1954)). The index is a special case of a broader concept
the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) in cooperative coalitional form games. In voting,
coalitional form games usually take (0;1)-form. In (0;1) games a coalition gets a worth
of zero, if it is a minority, and one, if it is a majority. Note that the complement of any
one-valued coalition always has a worth zero, which makes the game proper and weakly
monotonic in the size of the coalition. The SSI is based on the broad idea that an actor
who is able to break a winning coalition into losing, or vice versa, exerts power. Suppose
that an actor in this position is rewarded by a price, which ends up as money in the data.
Then the percentage of an actor￿ s swing positions of all swing positions predicts his/her
expected in￿ uence on voting outcome and hence his/her share of the cake in cake-division
or his/her share of receipts in the allocation of budget expenditure.
More formally, let N be a set of n member states in CM and let S ￿ N denote any
coalition of member states having s members. A voting game in CM can be characterized
by a set function v(S) taking on value 1 when a coalition S forms a quali￿ed majority and




(s ￿ 1)!(n ￿ s)!
n!
[v(S) ￿ v(S r i)]; (1)
where i = 1;:::;n. The ratio in (1) gives the probability of the country i being in a
potentially pivotal position in coalition S and the latter term counts those pivotal positions
8where country i is able to swing a winning coalition into losing, i.e. S is winning and the
removal of i makes it losing. Pivotal positions without this impact do not contribute to an
actor￿ s power. The SSI values sum to unity. Thus, SSI implies that the relative shares of
the players￿swing positions that have an impact predict their shares of the total pay-o⁄.
3.3 Evidence
In the existing power politics studies on the EU budget, one can distinguish between two
generations. The ￿rst generation concentrates on explaining member states￿net receipts
(payments) from (to) EU budget by measures of political power. The power politics
explanation of the net receipts can be justi￿ed by arguing that member states￿main
objective in budget negotiations is to maximize their net receipts, or to ￿ bring the bacon
back home.￿The second generation of studies concentrates on explaining the gross receipts
and stems from cooperative bargaining/voting games. This approach is based on the
argument that member states￿contributions to the budget are highly institutionalized and
can be treated as taxes.6 Consequently, member states can in￿ uence their net positions
only via expenditures they obtain in annual budgetary procedures.
Early attempts that apply the political power view to explain EU budget allocations
are Baldwin, Bergl￿f, Giavazzi, and WidgrØn (2001) and Baldwin, Francois, and Portes
(1997). Based on OLS regressions, these studies conclude that net budget receipts per
capita can be explained relatively well by measures of political power, whereas variables
like the agriculture share of GDP and GDP per capita fail to have statistically signi￿cant
impacts on net receipts. Kandogan (2000) studied the correlation between actual budget
shares and SSI and distinguished between CAP and structural spending. He ￿nds that
a member state￿ s adjusted percent of population in agriculture has predictive power for
CAP budget shares and argues that this ￿nding explains why some countries are receiving
more agricultural funds than implied by their voting power alone. He obtained similar
results for the structural funds.
The key inspiration behind the second generation models is to model EU budget
6With an exception of the UK and Belgium member states￿contributions are, in practice, one percent
of GNI in each country.
9allocation as a pure bargaining game or as a hybrid of a bargaining game and solidarity.
The former makes use of SSI as the measure of power. Since SSI gives a prediction
for the share of the expenditure that a country obtains in QMV bargaining game it is
natural to analyse gross rather than net receipts. In these models, member states￿needs
are proxied by measures of agriculture and national income. A common result in these
hybrid models is that power politics has a dominant role in explaining receipts (see Kauppi
and WidgrØn (2004)), while Kauppi and Widgren (2007) suggest that budget shares can
be explained solely by political power if Franco-German cooperation is taken into account.
In a more recent paper, Kauppi and WidgrØn (2008) distinguish between the allocation of
compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure, the latter being the area in which EP has
a true in￿ uence (see Section 2 above). The study ￿nds evidence that due to the potential
impact of EP a (minor) part of the budget allocation may be attributed to solidarity.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Preliminary Insights
The EU budget spending is divided into three parts: (i) CAP (agricultural funds), (ii)
structural funds (including cohesion funds), and (iii) other things (administration, R&D
etc.). Currently, CAP takes almost half of the budget, structural funds take a third, and
the rest is divided across various uses. If the budget allocations follow the principle of
solidarity and equality between member states, we expect that the poorest EU countries
receive the largest receipts per capita. In contrast to this expectation, Baldwin (2005)
￿nds that some of the richest EU countries obtain much larger receipts per capita than
many of the poorest EU countries. In particular, he shows that the CAP receipts improve
the wealth of the richest farmers of the EU rather than improve the poorest agricultural
areas to catch up with the rest of the EU. These observations suggest that the EU budget
spending cannot be explained by the needs view. The natural alternative view is the
power politics view that says the budget allocations re￿ ects member states￿voting power
in CM.
10We turn to examining how the budget allocations are related to our benchmark mea-
sure of voting power, the SSI. Above we argued that there is a crucial di⁄erence between
the so called compulsory and non-compulsory budget spending, as CM is the sole decision
maker on the former, while also EP has its say on the latter. We argued that through the
potential in￿ uence of the EP there is a chance that non-compulsory expenditure is driven
by solidarity and equality between member states. To see whether there is a di⁄erence,
we analyze the shares of the compulsory and non-compulsory budget spending together
with the total budget shares. Since there exist no direct data on member states￿shares of
compulsory and non-compulsory receipts we need to proxy them by CAP and structural
spending (see Section 2).
The original budget data contain annual observations for 1976-2006. This time span
covers ￿ve periods that di⁄er by the composition of the member states. The periods are (1)
1976-1980, (2) 1981-1985, (3) 1986-1994, (4) 1995-2003, and (5) 2004-2006 corresponding
to EU-9, EU-10, EU-12, EU-15 and EU-25. In what follows, we consider average budget
shares over these periods. We have a distinct voting power distribution (SSI) for each
period.
Table 1 presents the shares of the EU budget, separately for the total, compulsory
and non-compulsory expenditure, and the power distribution (SSI), all for 1995-2003, the
period of EU-15. Clearly, none of the budget allocations matches one-to-one with the
power distribution. As a summary measure of the di⁄erence between the budget shares









where sj and SSIj, respectively, is the budget share and the SSI value of country j. Table
2 reports the results for the total budget shares, the CAP and the structural funds shares
over the ￿ve periods: EU-9, EU-10, EU-12, EU-15 and EU-25. Clearly, the mismatch
between the budget allocation and the power distribution is the largest for the structural
funds and the smallest for the total budget. The same conclusion holds over all periods.
Another general observation is concerned with systematic patterns in the budget shares
11of speci￿c countries. Across the di⁄erent compositions of the EU, we ￿nd that the total
budget shares of France are clearly larger than the corresponding ￿power shares.￿Among
the other senior EU member states, the UK￿ s budget share is smaller than its ￿power
share￿in most periods, while the budget shares and the power shares of the remaining
senior states do not exhibit so systematic relationships. When we compare the budget
shares across younger member states, we ￿nd that Spain has constantly received a larger
share from the budget than its power share, while Austria, Finland and Sweden obtain
less than the benchmark power measure predicts.
4.2 Points and Questions
The above observations raise a series of points and questions. First, we note that the power
distribution has really the poorest match with the structural funds shares. This suggests
that issues other than our measure of power play a large role in the determination of the
allocation of the structural funds. Is it possible that solidarity drives this allocation rather
than political power? Our theoretical arguments above are in line with this hypothesis.
EP has real in￿ uence on the allocation of structural funds, and if it cares about solidarity,
then its will should translate into needs-based allocation of the structural funds. We
return to this question below.
Second, the shares of the CAP match better with the SSI than the structural funds
shares do. Does this mean that the power distribution drives the CAP shares? A challenge
to this interpretation is that the total budget shares still match better with the SSI
than the CAP shares. An alternative hypothesis is then that the total budget is in fact
determined by the power distribution. In this case, it is just a technical matter how the
total budget shares are obtained through the di⁄erent parts of the budget. If, for some
(technical) reason, a member state receives more from CAP than its SSI share implies,
then this is compensated by a smaller share from the structural funds. Look at the budget
shares of Table 2. The CAP share (23%) of France is double to its power share (12%),
while the share of structural funds (8%) is much smaller. This is consistent with the above
idea of ￿compensation.￿Still, France obtains about 40% more from the total budget than
12its ￿power share￿predicts. Is it just a coincidence that France obtains so much more in
excess to its power share? The data speaks against this assertion. We ￿nd that France
receives systematically larger shares from the budget than its power share implies. We
will return to this issue below.
To sum up, the above considerations suggest that both the pure power politics view
and the needs view have di¢ culty in explaining the past budget allocations. The power
distribution ￿ts better with the total budget shares and the CAP shares than with the
structural funds. On the other hand, we observe that some countries receive more and
some countries receive less than their power shares. This observations suggest that the
budget shares cannot be accounted for by the benchmark power distribution. While the
budget shares are not consistent with the benchmark power distribution, they do not
agree with the needs view either. Many member states receive more per capita than one
would assume if the funds are to support the poorest regions of the EU. We are left with
the hypothesis that sel￿sh power politics is the driving force but the benchmark measure
of power does not capture the power distribution right.
How do we capture the power of the member states right? An obvious idea is that
member states gain power from other sources in addition to their votes in CM. One
possibility is that the budget spending rules are initially ￿xed in a manner that it favors
some countries over others. The budget priorities (the ￿nancial frameworks) are decided
by the European Council, CM, EP and EC. This inter-institutional agreement (IIA) ￿xes
the budget frame for a period of seven years and these priorities are likely to prevent
CM from fully controlling how speci￿c parts of the budget are allocated over the period.
Blankart and Kirchner (2004) refer to ￿contractual rules.￿The IIA agrees on a contract
between member states and the supranational bodies of the Union that speci￿es how
certain parts of the budget are allocated or ear-marked across the policy domains. One
possibility is that the budget allocation is completely predetermined by the ￿nancial
framework so that the hands of the CM are fully tied, CM could not alter the pre-
de￿ned budget allocation. But, as Blankart and Kirchner (2004) argue, all contracts are
incomplete and are subject to revision. Thus, the ￿post-contractual decisions￿of the CM
induce changes to the originally agreed budget allocation. In view of these ideas, the
13actual budget allocation is partly determined by the contractual rules agreed in the IIAs
and partly by the power distribution.
The above hypotheses suggest various factors that may explain why the actual budget
shares of speci￿c member states deviate from the benchmark power shares. For example,
the member states may agree to contribute more to the EU budget, if they are promised
to receive some of the money back in the spending side. To measure this e⁄ect we will
examine whether the distribution of contributions have any association with the budget
shares. We now turn to some more formal statistical considerations.
4.3 OLS Regressions
We consider regressions of the form
sit = ￿ + ￿SSIit + ￿CONTRBit + ￿INCit + "it; (2)
where sit denotes the budget share, SSIit is the political power, CONTRBit is the share
of contributions, and INCit is per capita income relative to EU-average income per capita,
all for member state i in period t. The "it is an error term.
Table 3 reports estimation results for the equation (2) in three cases; column (1) is
for the shares of the total budget, columns (2) and (3), respectively, are for the shares
of compulsory and non-compulsory budget spending. Under the hypothesis that political
power (SSI) alone determines the budget shares we expect that the coe¢ cients in (2)
satisfy the restrictions ￿ = 1;￿ = ￿ = ￿ = 0. We compute the corresponding Wald test
statistic using the White￿ s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix estimator. Under
the assumption that the data are obtained by random sampling, the test statistic is
asymptotically ￿2-distributed (with four degrees of freedom) under the null hypothesis.
Of course, the assumption of random sampling does not hold in the present setting and
thus the test statistics should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, the p-values for
the Wald tests are very close to zero for all three regressions and therefore suggest that
the budget shares are not driven by the power distribution alone.
Take a closer look at estimation results of columns (1) and (2) in Table 3. Clearly, the
14SSI and the contribution share are powerful explanatory variables in both regressions. It
is quite interesting that their coe¢ cient estimates are both between 0 and 1 and that their
sum is almost 1. By contrast, the coe¢ cient estimate for income is rather small and its
t-ratio is well below two. A robust Wald test for the restriction ￿+￿ = 1;￿ = ￿ = 0 has a
large p-value suggesting that the budget shares are well predicted by a weighted average
of power and contribution. The results of the ￿nal column in Table 3 di⁄er from those in
the ￿rst two columns. The coe¢ cient estimate of the power variable is clearly larger than
one, while the coe¢ cient estimate for the contribution share is negative. Clearly, it is
di¢ cult to give meaningful interpretations for these coe¢ cient estimates. If anything, the
negative coe¢ cient estimate of the contribution share suggests that rich member states
tend to receive smaller shares from the structural funds than poor member states. The
fact that the coe¢ cient estimate of the income variable is also negative and has a t-ratio
of about 1.6 suggest that the needs view has some predictive content for the structural
budget shares.
In sum, the OLS regression results suggest that power politics and contribution shares
predict CAP shares, while solidarity might play a role as a determinant of structural
spending shares. At the aggregate level, power politics seems to be the dominant predictor
of the budget shares. It takes about 80%, while the remaining part may be attributed to
member states￿contributions.
As a ￿nal point, we look at the accuracy of the predictions of our regressions in more
detail. Table 4 summarizes results on the total budget shares and CAP shares for France,
Spain, Austria, Finland and Sweden over their membership periods. France and Spain
are countries that have constantly received much larger shares from the total budget
than is predicted by their power shares and contribution shares. The premium of France
is the most persistent. The premium of Spain has been very pronounced since EU-15.
By contrast, Austria, Finland and Sweden have obtained clearly smaller shares from the
budget than their power and contribution shares predict. For example, during the ongoing
regime of EU-25, Sweden has obtained a share of 1.5%, while its power measure alone
or its power measure and contribution share together predict a share of 3%. There is a
negative premium of 50%. The persistence of these deviations from the predictions is a
15puzzle to us. What explain this ￿ status quo bias￿?
4.4 Analysis of the Status Quo Bias
We turn to exploring the idea that the status quo bias may derive from ￿xations in
the budget structure. The underlying assumption is that rules set by the EU treaty
and especially the Financial frameworks largely determine the budget allocations. Thus,
France and Spain continue to receive their premiums as long as the budget structure is
tied to existing policies of CAP and structural funds. Similarly, Austria, Finland and
Sweden continue to su⁄er from their negative premiums as long as these policies govern
the budget spending. What is the reason why these biases are so persistent?
A key player in the game of budget structure is again CM since its internal decision-
making is based on a higher vote threshold than in EP and EC, i.e. its aggregate pref-
erences are more conservative than those of EP and EC. Is it possible to ￿nd su¢ cient
majority to support a change in the budget structure? To assess this question, we clas-
sify member states into ￿winners￿and ￿losers￿based on their power distribution (SSI)
values and realized budget shares, separately for CAP and structural funds. We do this
classi￿cation in terms of the number of votes. Our results are presented in Table 5. The
number of votes in group ￿f￿;￿g￿are for member states that receive less from CAP and
structural funds than their power shares predict. These votes would favor a decrease both
in the CAP and in the structural spending. By contrast, the votes in group ￿f+;+g￿are
those of the members states that bene￿t more from CAP and structural funds than their
power shares predict. Thus, votes in group ￿f+;+g￿would favor more spending in CAP
and structural funds. The two groups in between ￿lose￿in the allocation of CAP funds
and ￿bene￿t￿in the allocation of structural funds (group ￿f￿;+g￿ ), or vice versa (group
￿f+;￿g￿ ). Thus these votes have mixed preferences over the CAP and structural funds.
The results of Table 5 yield interesting insights into the dynamics of the structure of
the EU budget and the persistent patterns found above. First, member states in group
￿f￿;￿g￿ do not have a blocking minority in the periods of EU-9, -10 and -12. This
situation is favorable for an increase in the size of the budget. Consistent with this, the
16EU budget expanded very rapidly during those periods. The situation changed during
the period of EU-15, because the UK moves gradually from group ￿f+;￿g￿into group
￿f￿;￿g￿ . In consequence, the group ￿f￿;￿g￿becomes a blocking minority in EU-15.
The same holds for ￿f￿;+g￿ . Therefore, it became harder for CM to ￿nd support for an
increase in the budget size. Consistent with this, we ￿nd that the size and the structure
of the EU budget have remained very stable since late 1990s. The situation gets even
more stacked in EU-25, as the votes in group ￿f￿;￿g￿increase further in relative terms.
These observations suggest that there is little hope that CM could initiate a change in the
current structure of the EU budget, at least under the current voting rules of the CM.
The Lisbon Treaty modi￿es the voting rules of the CM quite considerably. This means
that the implied power distribution will be di⁄erent. It is of interest to ask whether the
change could make a di⁄erence to the structure of the EU budget. It seems there is no
more room for a change. The group ￿f+;+g￿has more than 35 % of votes in EU-25
and EU-27, which is su¢ cient for blocking, and the group ￿f￿;￿g￿consists of more than
16 member states in EU-25 and EU-27, which warrants their ability to block. A more
detailed analysis of the Lisbon Treaty￿ s impact on EU budget is, however, left for future
research.
In conclusion, the above considerations suggest that the structure of the EU budget is
likely to be persistent. This means that if the existing rules of CAP and structural funds
remain as they are, then France and Spain continue to enjoy extra premiums, while Aus-
tria, Finland and Sweden will su⁄er from negative premiums. What are the mechanisms
that prevent CM from making a change in the rules? As a candidate mechanism, we
point to the so called ￿ four percent rule￿that was established prior to EU-25. According
to this written rule, a member state￿ s budget receipts are not allowed to be larger than
four percent of its GDP. Does this rule a⁄ect the EU budget allocation, that is, does the
restriction bind? Interestingly, we ￿nd that the actual budget shares of the new Eastern
European member states are almost as large as they can under the four percent rule.
This observation suggests that the four percent rule prevents these member states from
obtaining as much from the budget as their power shares suggest.
175 Conclusion
This paper supports the idea that the EU budget battle involves one-shot games that have
persistent impacts on the budget allocations. In one way or the other, the member states
are able to establish rules or contracts that restrict the budget allocation in advance. In
the current status quo, France and Spain are the clearest winners of these restrictions,
while Austria, Finland and Sweden, not to mention the new member states, su⁄er largest
losses.
Despite of potential a priory restrictions on the budget, the power politics view is able
to predict the member states￿shares of CAP receipts and the total budget fairly well.
Our results suggest that roughly 20 % of the member states￿receipts derives from their
contribution shares, while the remaining part is attributed to the distribution of political
power. In structural spending, power politics does not give a clear prediction and we
obtain evidence that member states￿needs may matter in the allocation of these funds,
perhaps due to the in￿ uence of the European Parliament.
Our analysis of the stability of the budget structure suggests that political power
matters a great deal in EU decision-making. Indeed, power politics analysis indicates
that the current ￿ deadlock￿of the EU budget will remain stable. The new Lisbon rules
wont make a di⁄erence to the status quo bias. However, the improved position of the
European Parliament may have an impact on structural spending. But, this requires that
the Treaty be rati￿ed. Clearly, the EU budget battle is a sequence of interacting games.
A thorough modeling of the dynamics of the ￿ big game￿remains an interesting topic for
future research.
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19Table 1: Budget Allocation of EU-15
Total CAP Struct. SSI
France :170 :232 :079 :117
Germany :144 :146 :137 :117
Italy :121 :118 :128 :117
UK :088 :097 :065 :117
Belgium :026 :027 :012 :055
Netherlands :029 :036 :011 :055
Denmark :022 :031 :004 :035
Ireland :040 :043 :040 :035
Luxembourgh :002 :001 :001 :021
Greece :074 :066 :097 :055
Portugal :053 :018 :114 :055
Spain :180 :132 :282 :096
Austria :019 :022 :011 :045
Finland :015 :015 :010 :035
Sweden :017 :017 :009 :045
Table 2: Measuring the di⁄erence between budget allocations and the power distribution
Total CAP Struct.
EU-9 :043 :073 :282
EU-10 :076 :130 :470
EU-12 :085 :179 :291
EU-15 :214 :249 :690
EU-25 :242 :413 :736
Note: The numbers are computed by he formula
P
j(sj ￿ SSIj)2=SSIj; where sj and SIIj,
respectively, is the budget share and the SSI value of country j.
20Table 3: OLS Estimation Results
Total CAP Struct.
Regressor (1) (2) (3)
Political Power (SSI) :87 :59 1:77
(:11) (:17) (:28)
Contribution Share (CONTRB) :18 :40 -.41
(:07) (:11) (:19)
Income (INC) ￿:002 :001 -:024
(:004) (:006) (:015)
Constant ￿:002 ￿:0006 ￿:001
(:007) (:010) (:01)
R2 :87 :80 :64
Note: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. The sample consists of 71 observations
corresponding to the countries in EU-9 (1976-80), EU-10 (1981-85), EU-12 (1986-94), EU-15
(1995-2003), and EU-25 (2004-2006).
Table 4: Budget Share Predictions for Selected Member States
Total CAP
SSI Reg. Fit Share Reg. Fit Share
France EU-9 17:9 18:5 20:5 18:5 21:8
EU-10 17:4 18:1 20:2 18:2 23:2
EU-12 13:4 14:9 18:3 16:0 22:2
EU-15 11:7 13:0 16:5 14:0 23:2
EU-25 9:3 10:9 13:9 12:2 20:8
Spain EU-12 11:1 10:6 12:2 9:6 8:3
EU-15 9:6 9:2 17:0 8:6 13:2
EU-25 8:6 8:9 15:3 8:8 13:7
Austria EU-15 4:5 4:2 1:9 3:7 2:2
EU-25 3:0 2:9 1:8 2:7 2:6
Finland EU-15 3:5 3:1 1:5 2:7 1:5
EU-25 2:1 2:0 1:4 1:9 1:8
Sweden EU-15 4:5 4:2 1:6 3:9 1:7
EU-25 3:0 3:0 1:6 2:9 1:9
Notes: ￿SSI￿is the Shapley-Shubik power index. ￿Reg. Fit￿refers to predictions based on an OLS
regression of the budget share on SSI and the contribution share (see Table 3). ￿Share￿is the actual
budget share over the indicated period.
21Table 5: Numbers of votes that gain and/or lose from CAP and structural spending
{sgn(sCAP ￿ SSI), sgn(sSTR ￿ SSI)}
f￿;￿g f￿;+g f+;￿g f+;+g Total QMV BM
EU-9 7 28 23 0 58 41 18
EU-10 7 33 10 13 63 45 19
EU-12 10 25 23 18 76 54 23
EU-15 36 10 5 36 87 62 26
EU-25 169 43 12 97 321 232 90
Notes: The column ￿{￿,￿}￿indicates the number of Council votes for member states with shares of
CAP and Structural funds less than their power (SSI) shares, the column ￿{￿,+g￿indicates the
number of votes for member states with shares of CAP larger than and Structural funds less than their
power (SSI) shares, and so on. ￿Total￿is the total number of Council votes, ￿QMV￿is the quota













































Figure 2: The Budget Procedure of the EU, non-compulsory expenditure
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